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what’s left out of personal disposable income
after spending on consumption, non-mortgage
interest, and donations to charities, nonprofits,
and other entities. Disposable personal income is
defined as personal income after all taxes are
paid. But, at a closer look, what the NIPA consid-
ers personal income is different from what an
ordinary household might consider income.
For one thing, the NIPA measure of saving
does not include capital gains on assets, such as
stocks and bonds or housing. Certainly a house-
hold that enjoys a capital gain would think of 
it as income and, if the money isn’t spent, the
household would think of it as savings. The ex-
perts who compile the NIPA do not count capital
gains because they are interested in the resources
available for investment. If you sell a stock that
has appreciated $100, the person buying it has to
dip into his or her savings $100 more than if the
capital gain had not occurred. Therefore, the cap-
ital gain brings no net increase in national saving
and no extra resources for investment. However,
the capital gain has certainly made the seller bet-
ter off.
Although capital gains are not included in
personal income, taxes paid on realized capital
gains are deducted from before-tax income to get
disposable personal income. This seems odd to
say the least.2
The treatment of pensions is also controver-
sial. Employer contributions to defined contribu-
tion and defined benefit plans are considered
compensation. The contributions are, therefore,
included in personal income, as are the interest
and dividends earned on pension accounts.3
Pension accounts, however, cannot be accessed
until age 59 or older without paying a tax penalty.
Thus, households may not regard pension contri-
butions and earnings as personal income until
then because that money is not as accessible.
Households may be more likely to consider pen-
sion account withdrawals as income, and would
likely regard any money that is not spent as sav-
ing. Even though withdrawals are not considered
income by the NIPA, taxes paid on withdrawals
do reduce disposable personal income.
Guidolin and La Jeunesse (2007) argue that
the treatment of defined contribution plans is
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The United States appears to be a nation of
spendthrifts.1 Official measures suggest that per-
sonal saving has been declining and some believe
that we’re not saving enough for our own retire-
ments, given longer life expectancy and rapidly
growing out-of-pocket medical costs (Bernheim
1992; Skinner 2007). And because we’re not sav-
ing as much, we’re not doing as much to provide
resources for investment, which is financed by
personal, government, and business savings and
borrowing from abroad. Investment adds to our
capital stock, which helps increase worker pro-
ductivity and, ultimately, the wages and living
standards of current and future generations.
Relative to our incomes, we are not leaving as
much to our children as our parents left to us.
Just how little are we saving? The answer is
not obvious. There are two different prominent
measures of the saving rate—the National Income
and Products Account (NIPA) measure and the
Flow of Funds (FOF) measure. Both suggest a
rapid decline in saving over the past 20 years, 
but neither exactly conforms to what most house-
holds probably think of as saving. Moreover,
other, less prominent ways of looking at saving
imply Americans are less profligate.
National Income and Products
Account Measure
The measure of saving receiving the most public-
ity comes from the National Income and Product
Accounts (NIPA), which defines the personal sav-
ing rate as personal saving divided by personal
disposable income. Personal saving is defined as
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logically consistent, but they question the logic 
of treating defined benefit pensions in the same
manner. With a defined benefit plan, the em-
ployer makes all investment decisions and takes
all investment risk. If the defined benefit plan
earns a surplus, that surplus is not passed on to
employees but nevertheless shows up in em-
ployee personal income when it is earned. Later,
the employer may reduce contributions because
of past surpluses, and this would show up as a
reduction in the employee’s compensation. The
employee very probably ignores these ups and
downs in measured personal income and is only
interested in the expected present value of his
pension, which is relatively constant.
It may be preferable to ignore defined benefit
contributions and earnings when they occur and,
instead, to add them to disposable income when
they are received. However, the authors point
out that doing so would have a negligible effect
on the measured NIPA saving rate.4
Purchases of durable goods, such as automo-
biles, are not included in saving. Including them
net of depreciation would raise the net saving
rate by about 10 percentage points, but it would
also raise investment. Therefore, it would not
ease concern about Americans’ failure to finance
current investment levels.5
The NIPA measure of personal saving is not
very accurate. Personal saving is estimated as the
difference between two very large numbers—
disposable personal income and personal 
outlays. Very small proportionate errors in mea-
suring these two items can lead to huge propor-
tionate errors in measuring personal saving. 
As a result, personal saving estimates are often
revised by large amounts as the NIPA measure is
refined with more accurate measures of dispos-
able personal income and personal outlays.
Flow of Funds Measure
The second measure of saving is derived from
the Flow of Funds (FOF) tables published by the
Federal Reserve Board of Governors. Annual
household saving is measured by the net acqui-
sition of real and financial assets minus the
increase in household liabilities. The Board of
Governors provides two measures—one that
includes net investments in consumer durables
and one that does not. Conceptually, the mea-
sure that does not include consumer durables
should lead to the same result as the NIPA mea-
sure. However, significant discrepancies arise
because the two measures are compiled using
different data sources and there are minor def-
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Source: Federal Reserve Board and Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Note: The Flow of Funds measure of savings includes consumption of durable goods as savings while the NIPA measure does not. Disposable personal
income is from NIPA.
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initional differences. The FOF measure includes
changes in pension reserves and thus has the
same problem as the NIPA in treating defined
benefit pensions.
Neither the NIPA nor the FOF measure
paints a happy picture. Personal saving, accord-
ing to both measurements, has plummeted over
the past three decades. In 2005 and 2006, the per-
sonal saving rate fell to well below 1 percent—
the lowest level ever. In the third quarter of 2005,
it actually became negative. Because capital gains
are omitted in both measures, a negative saving
rate does not necessarily mean that households
are borrowers on average. The extremely low
saving rate of 2005 and 2006 is sometimes ex-
plained by the huge capital gains in housing in
those years. The resulting increase in household
wealth may have made people feel easier about
lowering their saving rate. It may also have
encouraged borrowing by refinancing mortgages
or by increasing other forms of consumer debt.
To some degree, the fall in personal saving
has been offset by an increase in borrowing 
from abroad. This helps maintain investment 
levels and the rate of growth of productivity and
wages, but we end up sending interest and divi-
dends to nonresidents. Our standard of living is
not increased as much as it would be if the same
level of investment were financed domestically.
An Alternative View
The NIPA and FOF saving measures create the
impression that households have become less
prudent over the past two decades. However, the
Federal Reserve produces another data series that
provides a very different view. That series tracks
household net worth by estimating the difference
between the value of a household’s assets and its
liabilities. Except for bond holdings that are val-
ued at cost, assets are valued at market prices.
Hence, changes in the net worth of households
reflect capital gains on assets, and those changes
in net worth can be defined as saving.
When the changes in net worth are divided
by disposable income, the ratio jumps around
erratically from year to year—probably partly
because of measurement problems and partly
because the numerator includes capital gains
while the denominator does not—but no discern-
able trend has emerged over the past 50 years.
Does that mean that we really have no saving
problem? It depends on how the saving problem
is defined. Net worth is a measure of well-being.
The fact that net worth has been growing quite
steadily along with income implies that people
are better prepared for retirement and for med-
ical and other emergencies than is suggested by
the NIPA and FOF saving measures.
This more sanguine view of saving is due
largely to the inclusion of capital gains. Although
capital gains add to household purchasing
power, they do not provide new resources for
investment. For that, you need greater saving as
measured by the NIPA and the FOF.
It should also be noted that capital gains can
quickly evaporate, as they did when the recent
housing bubble burst. Some also worry that as
baby boomers retire, asset sales will rise rapidly
and cause asset values to fall. But this worry is
probably overstated. Retirees tend to be careful
regarding dissaving and to the extent assets are
sold, they will be sold into a world capital mar-
ket that, with hope, continues to be buoyed by
very large saving rates in emerging economies
(Poterba 2004).
Conclusions
The NIPA and FOF measures of saving paint a
dismal picture. The rapid decline over the past 
20 years means we are not devoting sufficient
resources to investment. To the extent that invest-
ment levels have been maintained, it is because
the necessary financing has been found outside
the United States, but that means that a portion
of future interest and dividends will have to be
paid to investors abroad instead of raising the
living standards of Americans.
Nevertheless, Americans continue to be bet-
ter and better off as measured by their net worth.
Much of this improvement stems from capital
gains on old assets. Those capital gains cannot be
used to finance new investment, but they do pro-
vide purchasing power to households for retire-
ment or economic emergencies. Indeed, there is
probably a causal relation between the healthy
state of household balance sheets and the lack of
saving as traditionally measured. Households
may not be inclined to sacrifice and save more
when asset values are accumulating anyway.
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Recent problems in housing and financial mar-
kets may test this proposition.
Notes
1. This paper leans heavily on the analysis of Guidolin and
La Jeunesse (2007).
2. Paid estate taxes are not considered as deductions in com-
puting disposable personal income. Estate taxes are de-
fined as a capital transfer. Treating capital gains taxes in
the same way may have some merit.
3. Payments for the administrative costs of plans are consid-
ered to be personal outlays.
4. The effect may become more significant as baby boomers
start to retire and begin drawing their pensions.
5. Several other measurement issues are not discussed here,
including transfers between households and charitable
and nonprofit institutions, the use of nominal rather than
real interest rates in measuring the income from wealth,
whether education expenditures should be regarded as an
investment, and the treatment of stock options. For a dis-
cussion of these issues, see Reinsdorf (2005) and Guidolin
and La Jeunesse (2007).
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